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Griffin v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 42 (May 11, 2006)1 
 
CONTRACT LAW – INTERPRETATION 
 
Summary 
 
 Appellant Griffin, after sustaining severe personal injuries when a plane piloted by Kevin 
Jensen crashed into Griffin’s yard, sued Jensen in Nevada state court.  Jensen carried an Old 
Republic Insurance Company aviation policy for the plane.  The Old Republic aviation insurance 
application contained a clause, which Jensen initialed, stating that the aircraft would not be 
covered “unless a standard airworthiness certificate is in full force and effect.”  Further, the 
policy excluded coverage when “the Airworthiness certificate of the aircraft is not in full force 
and effect” or when “the aircraft has not been subjected to the appropriate airworthiness 
inspection(s) as required under current applicable Federal Air Regulations for the operations 
involved.”   
 When Jensen purchased the policy he possessed a current airworthiness certificate.  
However, at the time of the crash, the airworthiness certificate had lapsed.  Old Republic sought 
declaratory judgment in United States District Court of the District of Nevada claiming it had no 
obligation to pay damages to either Griffin or Jensen because the policy expressly excluded 
coverage without a current airworthiness certificate.  Griffin maintained that Old Republic 
should not be able to avoid liability because no causal relationship existed between the lapse in 
the certificate and the loss incurred.  
 
The federal district court granted summary judgment to Old Republic because Nevada 
law did not require a causal relationship between the exclusion clause and the loss.  Griffin 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.  The Ninth Circuit submitted a certified question 
of law to the Nevada Supreme Court, which this opinion addressed. 
 
Issue and Disposition 
 
Issue  
 
The certified question before the court was whether: 
 
Under Nevada law, may an insurer deny coverage under an aviation insurance 
policy for failure to comply with an unambiguous requirement of the policy or is 
a casual connection between the insured’s noncompliance and the accident 
required? 
 
Disposition 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court held that Nevada law requires no causal connection between 
safety-related aviation policy exclusion and the loss for the insurer to exclude coverage.  
                                            
1 By Jacqueline A. Gilbert 
However, in order to avail itself of this rule of law, the insurer must draft an unambiguous and 
narrowly tailored exclusion clause that is essential to the risk it undertakes. 
 
Commentary 
 
Court’s Rationale 
 
 The Court relied on the plain, unambiguous language of the exclusion clause to 
determine that it only had to determine if the Old Republic exclusion clause should be voided on 
public policy grounds.  The Court concluded both Nevada statute2 and public policy support 
upholding safety-related exclusion clauses, regardless of causal connection. As requiring a 
current airworthiness certificate falls squarely within a safety-related regulation, lack of such 
certificate meets the requirements for a valid exclusion clause. 
 
Survey of Law in Other Jurisdictions 
 
 Griffin alleged that the modern trend in insurance law it to require a causal connection 
between noncompliance and the loss for an insurer to avoid liability.  Griffin argued for the 
Court to adopt the modern trend.  However, the majority view requires no causal connection if 
the exclusion clause is unambiguous.  The Court referenced cases from the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals,3 as well as courts in Arizona,4 Georgia,5 Louisiana,6 New Mexico,7 and Oklahoma8 
holding with the majority view.  The Court discussed no cases supporting Griffin’s position. 
 
State of the Law before Griffin   
 
 Nevada courts construe insurance policies according to plain language and “from the 
viewpoint of one not trained in law.”9  Exclusions and restrictions must be drafted to clearly 
communicate “to the insured the nature of the limitation.”10  While courts may not alter 
                                            
2 NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.150 provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to operate or cause or authorize to 
be operated any civil aircraft within this State unless such aircraft has an appropriate effective certificate, permit or 
license issued by the United States.”   
3 Hollywood Flying Service v. Compass Ins. Co., 597 f.2d 507, 508-09 (5th Cir. 1979) (no liability where a 
airworthiness certificate was not in full effect due to missing manual despite no causal relation between exclusion 
and losses). 
4 Security Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 763 P.2d 246, 249 (Ariz. 1988) (where exclusion is narrow, specific, and 
unambiguous no causal connection required). 
5 Grigsby v. Houston Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 148 S.E.2d 925, 927 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (if a loss is not covered by 
the policy due to failure to meet required terms, a causal relationship is not required). 
6 U.S. Fire Ins. V. W. Monroe Charter Service, 504 So.2d 93, 99-100 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (no causal connection 
required if language of exclusion clause does not expressly require the connection). 
7 Security Mut. Cas. Co. v. O’Brien, 662 P.2d 639, 640-41 (N.M. 1983) (insurer’s exclusion for lack of 
airworthiness certificate required no causal connection to avoid liability). 
8 Avemco Ins. Co. v. White, 841 P.2d 588, 590 (Okla. 1992) (exclusion for lack of airworthiness certificate required 
no causal connection if the terms are unambiguous and clear “at the time the contract was negotiated.”)(emphasis in 
original). 
9 Vitale v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 116 Nev. 590, 594, 5 P.3d 1054, 1057 (2000).   
10 Id.  
unambiguous policy terms,11 courts may, for public policy reasons, void unambiguous exclusion 
clauses.12   
 
 The Court cites a number of Nevada cases requiring no causal connection if exclusionary 
clauses were unambiguous.13  Only where the exclusion clause itself required a causal 
connection has the Court upheld the need for the insured to establish such connection in order to 
avoid liability.14   
 
Effect of Griffin on Current Nevada Law 
 
Nevada law remains substantially unchanged with Griffin.  Where insurance policy 
clauses are unambiguous, the Court will not void them unless public policy requires that 
outcome.  However, the Court adopted a narrower rule for exclusion clauses, requiring not only 
that they lack ambiguity, but that the exclusions be narrowly tailored and essential to the risk 
undertaken by the insured.   
 
Current Nevada statute and case law define “narrowly tailored” and “essential to the risk 
undertaken by the insurer.”  To be narrowly tailored, the exclusion clause must “clearly and 
distinctly communicate[] to the insured the nature of the limitation.”15  If the excluded activities 
are material to the insurer accepting risk or to the “hazard assumed by the insurer”16, then the 
exclusion is essential to the risk undertaken by the insurer.17   
 
Conclusion 
 
 This case dealt only with a specific certified question from the Ninth Circuit concerning 
an aviation policy.  However, based on the Court’s analysis, no causal connection between 
noncompliance and losses incurred by the insured for the insurer to avoid liability if the 
exclusion clause is: 
 
 (1) unambiguous; 
 (2) narrowly tailored; 
 (3) essential to the risk undertaken by the insurer. 
 
                                            
11 Canfora, 121 Nev. at ___, 121 P.3d at 603. 
12 See generally Continental Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 120 Nev. 506, 96 P.3d 747 (2004). 
13 Griffin, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 42, note 16 (citing Fire Ins. Exch. v. Cornell, 120 Nev. 303, 306-07, 90 P.3d 978, 980 
(2004); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Neal, 115 Nev. 62, 65 64 P.3d 472, 473 (2003); Dwello v. Amer. Reliance Ins. Co., 
115 Nev. 422, 424-25, 990 PP.2d  190, 191-92 (1999); and Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Young, 108 Nev. 328, 332-33, 832 
P.2d 376, 378-79 (1992)). 
14 McDaniel v. Sierra Health & Life Ins. Co., 118 Nev. 596, 53 P.3d 904 (2002) (upholding an exclusion clause in 
an accidental death benefit policy when the insured’s legal intoxication caused his own death and passenger’s 
injuries and the policy expressly excluded any losses incurred directly or indirectly from the insured’s felonious 
conduct).   
15 Vitale, 116 Nev. at 594, 5 P.3d at 1057. 
16 Griffin, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 42. 
17 NEV. REV. STAT. § 687.110(2) (2005). 
